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Early Warning System: An Assesment of Vulnerability 
Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for Emerging Markets  
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Morris Goldstein, Graciela L. Kaminsky, and Carmen M. Reinhart 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000) 
 
 
 
Predicting the timing of currency and banking crises is likely to remain an elusive task 
for academics, financial market participants, and policymakers.  Few foresaw the Asian crises 
and fewer still could have imagined their severity.  However, recent events have highlighted the 
importance of improving upon a system of  “early warnings.” The signals approach introduced in 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and applied to the out-of-sample data during January 1996- June 
1997 in this section allows us to glean where trouble spots may be brewing. 
Needless to say, such exercises are fraught with the traditional Type I and Type II errors.  
Assuming the null hypothesis to be that the economy is in a state of “tranquility,” a high 
proportion of indicators flashing leads one to reject that hypothesis in favor of the alternative, 
namely that a crisis is likely in the next twenty four months. Yet, a country may be “vulnerable,” 
in the sense that a high proportion of variables are signaling trouble, yet the crisis may be averted 
through either good luck, good policies, or credible implicit bail-out guarantees.  This would be 
an example of a Type II error. A recent example of this case is Brazil, in which multiple signals 
were flashing as early as 1997 but these warning signs did not culminate into a full-fledged crisis 
until 1999.  Alternatively, the crisis may occur without much warning signs from the indicators, 
this Type I error, or “the dog that did not bark in the night” could be interpreted as evidence of 
contagion or multiplicity of equilibria, an issue which we will take up later an in particularly 
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relevant for understanding the Indonesian crisis. 
 
 
Vulnerability and signals 
Tables 5.1-5.4 summarize some of the key features of applying the signals approach to 
the recent data.  The first column of the table provides information on the total number of signals 
from the 15 monthly indicators listed in Tables 3.1.  The second column provides information on 
the number of monthly indicators sending signals while the third column lists the number from 
the top five indicators, which are real exchange rates, stock prices, the money multiplier, output 
and exports for banking crises and real exchange rates, stock prices, exports, M2/reserves, and 
output for currency crises.  The next three columns give the comparable information for the eight 
annual indicators.  On the case of the annual indicators, we focus on the top three indicators, 
which are short-term capital flows/GDP, current account balance/investment, and the overall 
budget deficit/GDP for banking crises; for currency crises the current account deficit/GDP 
replaces short-term capital inflows, while the other two indicators are the same.  The last column 
gives the percent of the twenty three indicators that are signaling.  The reason to highlight the 
number of top indicators signaling, is that these are the indicators with the lowest noise-to-signal 
ratios hence, a signal from these is more meaningful than a signal from a less reliable indicator.  
Table 5.1 provides this information for currency crises using the thresholds reported in 
Table 3.2.  As the last column highlights there is considerable cross-country variation, with the 
lowest proportion of signals coming from Egypt and the highest from the Czech Republic, which 
indeed floated following a speculative attack and substantial reserve losses in May 1997.  Table 
5.2 does exactly the same accounting exercise for  “borderline” signals.  Specifically, we 
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enlarged the size of the rejection region by five percent for all the indicators.  Hence, for 
instance, instead of having a 10 percent threshold for stock prices for the case of currency crises, 
we now have a 15 percent threshold.  This sensitivity analysis increases the likelihood of having 
a Type II error (rejecting the null hypothesis of tranquility when you shouldn’t) while reducing 
the probability of a Type I error (not rejecting when you should).  In any case, including 
“borderline” signals does not alter the picture for some countries (such as Argentina) but it 
increases the proportion of indicators signaling markedly, as well as the number of signals, for 
countries like Korea (from 48 to 65 percent) and South Africa (from 39 to 52 percent).  The next 
two tables report the tally for banking crises using the original thresholds (Table 5.3) and the 
“borderline” scenario.  Not surprisingly, the country profiles that emerge are similar as several of 
the indicators have common thresholds or critical values for currency and banking crises.   
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 5.1 Signals of balance of payment crises 
 
 
 
Monthly indicators 
 
Annual indicators 
 
Total 
 
Country 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicator
s 
signaling 
 
Percent of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Argentina 
 
35 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
22 
 
Bolivia 
 
33 
 
6 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Brazil 
 
37 
 
5 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
22 
 
Chile 
 
34 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
13 
 
Colombia 
 
27 
 
5 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
77 
 
10 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
52 
 
Denmark 
 
21 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
17 
 
Egypt 
 
14 
 
3 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
13 
 
Finland 
 
74 
 
7 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Greece 
 
32 
 
8 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
0 
 
43 
 
Indonesia 
 
6 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
17 
 
Israel 
 
24 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
22 
 
Korea 
 
32 
 
8 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
48 
 
Malaysia 
 
36 
 
9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Mexico 
 
11 
 
2 
 
0 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
17 
 
Norway 
 
9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
17 
 
Peru 
 
16 
 
2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
13 
 
Philippines 
 
59 
 
8 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
43 
 
South 
Africa 
 
42 
 
8 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Spain 
 
44 
 
6 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Sweden 
 
55 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Thailand 
 
50 
 
6 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
30 
 
Turkey 
 
22 
 
4 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Uruguay 
 
58 
 
5 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Venezuela 
 
18 
 
5 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
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5.2 “Borderline” Signals of balance of payment crises 
 
 
 
Monthly indicators 
 
Annual indicators 
 
Total 
 
Country 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicator
s 
signaling 
 
Percent of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Argentina 
 
35 
 
3 
 
0 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
22 
 
Bolivia 
 
33 
 
8 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Brazil 
 
39 
 
7 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
32 
 
Chile 
 
40 
 
5 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Colombia 
 
49 
 
7 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
43 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
85 
 
10 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
61 
 
Denmark 
 
28 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Egypt 
 
22 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
17 
 
Finland 
 
86 
 
8 
 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
43 
 
Greece 
 
41 
 
8 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
48 
 
Indonesia 
 
9 
 
4 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
22 
 
Israel 
 
37 
 
6 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Korea 
 
63 
 
11 
 
3 
 
5 
 
4 
 
1 
 
65 
 
Malaysia 
 
40 
 
9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Mexico 
 
24 
 
2 
 
0 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
17 
 
Norway 
 
31 
 
7 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Peru 
 
26 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Philippines 
 
68 
 
8 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
48 
 
South 
Africa 
 
63 
 
10 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
52 
 
Spain 
 
55 
 
7 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Sweden 
 
60 
 
6 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Thailand 
 
54 
 
6 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
30 
 
Turkey 
 
33 
 
5 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Uruguay 
 
71 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Venezuela 
 
29 
 
5 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
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 5.3 Signals of banking crises 
 
 
 
Monthly indicators 
 
Annual indicators 
 
Total 
 
Country 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicator
s 
signaling 
 
Percent of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Argentina 
 
36 
 
4 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
22 
 
Bolivia 
 
42 
 
8 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Brazil 
 
39 
 
6 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Chile 
 
34 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
13 
 
Colombia 
 
38 
 
5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
35 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
81 
 
10 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
1 
 
52 
 
Denmark 
 
24 
 
4 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
22 
 
Egypt 
 
18 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
13 
 
Finland 
 
77 
 
7 
 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
39 
 
Greece 
 
39 
 
8 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
43 
 
Indonesia 
 
10 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
17 
 
Israel 
 
32 
 
6 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Korea 
 
42 
 
10 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
57 
 
Malaysia 
 
42 
 
9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Mexico 
 
16 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Norway 
 
30 
 
8 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Peru 
 
19 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Philippines 
 
59 
 
8 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
43 
 
South 
Africa 
 
55 
 
10 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
43 
 
Spain 
 
51 
 
7 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Sweden 
 
59 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Thailand 
 
53 
 
6 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
30 
 
Turkey 
 
27 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Uruguay 
 
74 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
26 
 
Venezuela 
 
18 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
26 
 7 
 5.4 “Borderline” signals of banking crises 
 
 
 
Monthly indicators 
 
Annual indicators 
 
Total 
 
Country 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Total 
signals 
 
Number of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Top 
indicator
s 
signaling 
 
Percent of 
indicators 
signaling 
 
Argentina 
 
46 
 
7 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
35 
 
Bolivia 
 
45 
 
8 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Brazil 
 
44 
 
9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Chile 
 
43 
 
7 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Colombia 
 
70 
 
9 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
52 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
87 
 
10 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
52 
 
Denmark 
 
29 
 
6 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Egypt 
 
24 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
13 
 
Finland 
 
88 
 
8 
 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
43 
 
Greece 
 
50 
 
9 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
48 
 
Indonesia 
 
14 
 
4 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
22 
 
Israel 
 
49 
 
8 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Korea 
 
74 
 
13 
 
5 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
61 
 
Malaysia 
 
49 
 
9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Mexico 
 
30 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Norway 
 
37 
 
8 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Peru 
 
27 
 
6 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Philippines 
 
73 
 
8 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
43 
 
South 
Africa 
 
68 
 
10 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
48 
 
Spain 
 
58 
 
9 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
43 
 
Sweden 
 
66 
 
8 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
39 
 
Thailand 
 
58 
 
9 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
43 
 
Turkey 
 
35 
 
6 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
35 
 
Uruguay 
 
86 
 
6 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
30 
 
Venezuela 
 
34 
 
6 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
35 
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So who is vulnerable?  Ideally, we want to take into account whether a country is 
vulnerable to either a currency or a banking crises, since so often the two go hand-in-hand.   One 
would also like to give a higher weight to the more reliable indicators.  Kaminsky (1998) 
constructs such a composite index to gauge the probability of a crisis conditioned on multiple 
signals from various indicators; the more reliable indicators receive a higher weight in the 
composite index. This methodology and its out-of-sample results are described in the latter part 
of this chapter. 
While we do not tabulate the probability of a crisis in this exercise (this is take up in the 
following part of this chapter), conditioned on a composite index, in what follows, some of the 
information on the incidence of signals and the quality of the indicators signaling is presented in 
summary form for the twenty “emerging market economies” in our sample for currency and 
banking crises in Table 5.5.  The first column tallies a count of the “weighted” signals.  Each 
indicator either sends a signal which we assign the value of one, or does not signal, to which we 
assign a value of zero.  Yet, simply counting the proportion of indicators signaling (as in Tables 
5.1-4) does not discriminate among the highly heterogenous performance of the indicators.   
To remedy this, we begin by eliminating from our list of potential leading indicators 
those variables which had a noise-to-signal ratio above unity; this is tantamount to stating that 
their marginal forecasting ability (P(CS)=0 or less.  As Table 3.1 highlights, for banking crises, 
this eliminates imports, the lending-deposit ratio, the terms of trade, government consumption 
growth, and FDI/GDP.  For currency crises, this drops from the list the domestic-foreign interest 
rate differential, the lending-deposit ratio, bank deposits, central bank credit to the public sector 
and FDI/GDP.  For the remaining indicators with noise-to-signal ratios below unity, we weighed 
the signal by the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratios reported in Tables 3.1-4.  Hence, for a 
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currency crisis let’s suppose that both the real exchange rate and imports are issuing a signal; the 
former would receive a weight of 4.55 (or 1/0.22) while the latter would only receive a weight of 
1.49 (or 1/0.87).  If all 18 remaining indicators were sending signals, the maximum value that 
this index could score is 30.05 for banking crises and 33.23 for currency crisis.  This score is a 
simple sum of the inverse of the noise-to-signal for the indicators that are retained.  However, it 
is seldom the case that every indicator signals.  Table 5.5 presents the composite score of the 
indicators that are signaling for 20 of the emerging markets in our sample for currency and 
banking crises separately.  The first column provides the relevant value for a currency crisis, 
while the second provides information on the vulnerability of the country (by this measure) 
relative to the remaining 19 countries.  Hence, South Africa, the Czech Republic, and Thailand 
registered as the most vulnerable on the basis of the signals issued and the quality of those 
signals in the January 1996-June 1997 period. 
For banking crises, the comparable exercise places the Czech Republic, Korea, and 
Greece as the most vulnerable. Perhaps, not surprisingly, near the bottom of the list are countries 
such as Mexico and Venezuela which are still recovering from their 1994-95 crises. 
Lastly, to assess the extent of vulnerability to financial crises, using alternatives measures 
we provide information in Table 5.6 on:  i) the average proportion of indicators signaling 
banking and currency crises; ii) average proportion of the top eight indicators (monthly and 
annual) that  are signaling; and the average of the “weighted” indices reported in Table 5.5 for 
currency and banking crises.  The table also ranks the countries, by these three criteria, 
depending on the degree of “vulnerability.” 
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 5.5 “Weighing” the signals: Currency and banking crises in emerging markets 
 
 
 
 
Currency crises 
 
Banking crises 
 
Country 
 
Weighted signals 
 
Rank 
 
Weighted signals 
 
Rank 
 
Argentina 
 
5.41 
 
 16 
 
7.98 
 
10 
 
Bolivia 
 
6.59 
 
12 
 
7.30 
 
 13   
 
Brazil 
 
7.57 
 
10 
 
6.08 
 
14 
 
Chile 
 
5.90 
 
15 
 
5.74 
 
16 
 
Colombia 
 
10.59 
 
8 
 
11.87 
 
6 
 
Czech 
Republic* 
 
15.42 
 
2 
 
17.24 
 
1 
 
Egypt 
 
6.02 
 
14 
 
8.33 
 
9 
 
Greece 
 
14.27 
 
6 
 
14.15 
 
3 
 
Indonesia* 
 
7.54 
 
11 
 
8.33 
 
9 
 
Israel 
 
6.30 
 
13 
 
10.38 
 
8 
 
Korea* 
 
14.57 
 
4 
 
14.55 
 
2 
 
Malaysia* 
 
12.46 
 
7 
 
7.74 
 
12 
 
Mexico 
 
2.82 
 
19 
 
2.59 
 
19 
 
Peru 
 
2.82 
 
19 
 
5.33 
 
17 
 
Philippines* 
 
14.40 
 
5 
 
11.52 
 
7 
 
South 
Africa 
 
16.52 
 
1 
 
12.74 
 
4 
 
Thailand* 
 
14.63 
 
3 
 
12.09 
 
5 
 
Turkey 
 
8.21 
 
9 
 
7.87 
 
11 
 
Uruguay 
 
4.40 
 
18 
 
4.88 
 
18 
 
Venezuela 
 
5.28 
 
17 
 
6.02 
 
15 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes the country has already had a currency crisis, a banking crisis, or both in 1997-98. 
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 5.6 The vulnerability to financial crises in emerging markets: Alternative measures 
  
 
Country 
 
Average 
proportion of 
indicators 
signaling both 
crises 
 
Rank 
 
Average 
proportion top 
nine indicators 
signaling both 
crises 
 
Rank 
 
Average of the 
“weighted” 
signals 
 
Rank 
 
Argentina 
 
29 
 
11 
 
11 
 
5 
 
6.69 
 
14 
 
Bolivia 
 
35 
 
8 
 
22 
 
4 
 
6.94 
 
12 
 
Brazil 
 
36 
 
7 
 
33 
 
3 
 
6.82 
 
13 
 
Chile 
 
31 
 
9 
 
33 
 
3 
 
5.74 
 
17 
 
Colombia 
 
48 
 
4 
 
44 
 
2 
 
11.23 
 
7 
 
Czech Republic* 
 
57 
 
2 
 
56 
 
1 
 
16.33 
 
1 
 
Egypt 
 
15 
 
15 
 
11 
 
5 
 
6.42 
 
15 
 
Greece 
 
48 
 
4 
 
44 
 
2 
 
14.21 
 
4 
 
Indonesia* 
 
22 
 
14 
 
44 
 
2 
 
7.93 
 
11 
 
Israel 
 
35 
 
8 
 
44 
 
2 
 
8.34 
 
9 
 
Korea* 
 
63 
 
1 
 
56 
 
1 
 
14.56 
 
3 
 
Malaysia* 
 
39 
 
6 
 
33 
 
3 
 
10.10 
 
8 
 
Peru 
 
30 
 
10 
 
22 
 
4 
 
4.08 
 
19 
 
Philippines* 
 
46 
 
5 
 
33 
 
3 
 
12.96 
 
6 
 
Mexico 
 
24 
 
13 
 
11 
 
5 
 
2.71 
 
20 
 
South Africa 
 
50 
 
3 
 
33 
 
3 
 
14.63 
 
2 
 
Thailand* 
 
35 
 
8 
 
44 
 
2 
 
13.36 
 
5 
 
Turkey 
 
35 
 
8 
 
33 
 
3 
 
8.04 
 
10 
 
Uruguay 
 
28 
 
12 
 
11 
 
5 
 
4.88 
 
18 
 
Venezuela 
 
31 
 
9 
 
22 
 
4 
 
6.02 
 
16 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes the country has already had a currency crisis, a banking crisis, or both in 1997-98. 
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Clustered at the top of the list are several of the countries that have had or are still 
undergoing a financial crises; these countries are denoted by an asterisk (*).  This suggests a 
relatively favorable out-of-sample performance for the “signals” approach.  The three measure of 
vulnerability provide similar rankings for most of the “extreme” cases, such as the Czech 
Republic, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines, among the countries that have already had crises 
and South Africa, Colombia, and Greece among those that have not.  In the case of Greece, 
however, there was an orderly devaluation, while in Colombia’s case there was both a 
devaluation (in August 1998) as well as serious banking sector difficulties.  For countries such as 
Thailand and to a lesser degree Indonesia taking into account the “quality” of the indicator 
signalling changes the overall ranking considerably. 
While this exercise allows us to weigh the relative propensity to crisis across countries at 
a point in time, indeed, it is akin to a static snap shot, it does not convey information on the 
dynamics of the process. To assess to what extent a country is becoming more or less vulnerable 
to crisis over time, one would need a continuum of such snap shots.  The analysis in the next 
section of this chapter, which maps the composite index described in this section onto the time-
varying probability of a crisis fills this gap and allows us to extend our out-of-sample evaluation 
of the signals approach.  
 
A Composite Indicator: Methodology 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we examined the likelihood of a country falling prey to a speculative 
attack or to a banking crisis by focusing on the information provided by individual indicators. 
That is, we assessed the odds of a currency crisis after, for example, an appreciation of the 
domestic currency or the probability of a banking crisis following the collapse of the stock 
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market.  This exercise was useful because it allowed us to discriminate among the types of 
indicators that may be useful in anticipating the onset of financial crises.  At the same time, as 
discussed in the previous section, this focus on individual signs of trouble may result in an partial 
picture of an economy in the eve of financial crises. This is because, while currency and banking 
crises may arise as a result of an isolated shock, most of the time they are preceded by more 
systemic problems in the economy, including the financial sector.1 
Most often, crises erupr as the economy collapses under the strain of losses in 
competitiveness, a deterioration of the current account, a profound slowdown in growth, burst of 
stock bubbles, and the “credit crunches” that typically follow overlending cycles. Thus, we need 
to combine these individual manisfestations of problems into an indicator of economic distress 
that is continuously evolving. 
As discussed earlier, one straightforward way of capturing the fragility of the economy at 
the onset of a crisis is to keep track of the number of signals being issued in the different sectors 
of the economy.  Presumably, the larger the number of red flags coming from different sectors of 
the economy, the higher the odds of a financial collapse. However, the number of individual 
indicators “signaling” does not fully use the information provided by the univariate indicators 
because it does not account for the different forecasting ability of each variable. 
                     
     
1
 See Kaminsky (1998) for a test of the multiplicity of economic problems before crises. 
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To account for ( i) the multiplicity of problems in the economy; (ii) the heterogeneous 
forecasting ability of the univariate indicators; and (iii) the time-varying dimension of the 
likelihood of a crisis (an issue that we did not address in the previous cross-country 
comparisons), we construct the following composite indicator, 
  
In (5.1) it is assumed that there are n different univariate indicators. Each indicator has a 
differentiated ability to forecast crises and, as before, this ability can be summarized by the 
noise-to-signal ratio, here denoted by ωj.  St j is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
univariate indicator, S j crosses its critical threshold and is thus signaling a crisis and zero 
otherwise. As before, the noise-to-signal ratio is calculated under the assumption that an 
indicator issues a correct signal if a crisis occurs within the following 24 months. All other 
signals are  considered false alarms. 
Once we construct this composite indicator, we can then proceed as we did with the 
individual indicators in Chapters 2- 3 to choose a critical value for the composite indicator so 
that when the composite indicator crosses this threshold, a crisis is deemed to be “imminent.”2 
As before, this “critical”  threshold could chosen so as to be the one that minimizes the 
noise-to-signal ratio of the composite indicator.  Moreover, we could also calculate the 
probability of a crisis conditional on the composite indicator signaling a crisis (i.e., crossing the 
critical threshold) as well as the odds of a crisis when the composite indicator is not signaling.  
                     
     
2
 Meaning, as in the individual indicators, in the next 24 months. 
ω jt
j
n
1j=
t /S = I ∑  
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However, this procedure would not give us an exhaustive report of the extent of the built-up of 
weakness in the economy as the crisis approaches. Since, it is dichotomous, it will only provide 
two types of information–namely, signal or no signal.  
To introduce shades of grey,however, we are going to proceed somewhat differently in 
what follows. We are going to track the build-up of weaknesses in the economy and assess the 
how the likelihood of a crisis evolves over time. For each value of the composite indicator at a 
point in time we will calculate the corresponding probability of a crisis.  Hence, as the numerical 
value of the composite indicator increases (as the number of reliable signals increase)–so does 
the probability of a crisis.  
The idea is to analyze the empirical distribution of the indicator jointly with the 
occurrences of crises and estimate probabilities of crises conditional on different values of the 
composite indicator.  We would like to evaluate what the odds of a crisis are if none of the 
univariate indicators are signaling, that is when the composite indicator takes on a value of zero 
or when all the univariate indicators are signaling and the composite reaches its maximum value.  
But we would also like to evaluate the intermediate scenarios, which depend on both how many 
and which of the indicators are signaling, as the more reliable indicators are assigned a higher 
weight in the composite. For example, we would like to calculate the probability of a crises 
conditioned on knowing that the value of the indicator is in the 9-12 range, which as we saw 
from the cross- section analysis earlier in this chapter was associated with a number of the recent 
crises (see Table 5.5). 
In practice, we can construct this set of probabilities using the information on the value of 
the composite indicator for all the countries in the sample together with the information on 
crises. Probabilities of crises are estimated as follows:  
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where I is the lower bound of the range we are interested in (9 in our earlier example) and   is 
the upper bound of the range we are interested in (12 in our example). 
 Hence, as before, we have the following two by two matrix, 
 
 
 
Crisis occurs in the following 
24 months 
 
No crisis occurs in the following 
24 months 
 
  
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
 
C 
 
D 
 
  These probabilities will be estimated using all the information from all the countries in 
the sample. Once we estimate these probabilities and using the information on the number of 
signals being issued at any moment of time, we can construct time series probabilities of crisis 
for every country Ptm  is the probability of crisis of country m in period t.  
Once we construct these time series of crises probabilities, we can also evaluate the 
forecasting ability of the composite indicator and compare its track record to that of other 
indicators, such our top-ranked univariate indicator, the real exchange rate.  To conduct this 
“horserace,” we follow Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) and employ the Quadratic Probability 
Score (QPS) as our metric of goodness of fit. In particular, the QPS evaluates the average 
closeness of the predicted probabilities and the observed realizations, as measured by a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one when there is a crisis and zero otherwise. 3 
                     
     
3
 This approach has been also to assess the ability of various indicators to anticipate 
turning points in the business cycle (see Diebold and Rudebusch 1989). 
B)+A/(A = )I < I < I| P(C t  
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where k=1,2,3 refers to the indicator, Pkt, refers to the probability associated with that indicator 
and Rt are the zero-one realizations.  The QPS rages from zero to two, with a score of zero 
corresponding to perfect accuracy. 
 
A Composite Indicator: Empirical Results 
The methodology described in Chapter 5 was applied to the countries in the sample. In 
what follows, we first examine the sample probabilities of crises using the information from the 
composite indicator so as to have a reading on the links between the state of the economy and the 
eruption of banking and currency crises. Second, we examine the performance of the composite 
indicator both in-sample and out-of-sample and we rank the indicator ability relative to that of a 
naive forecast of crises and that of the best univariate indicator: the real exchange rate. Third, we 
examine the onset of the Asian crisis as captured by the probabilities of crises obtained using the 
composite indicator. 
Table 5.7 reports the conditional probabilities of both currency and banking crises using 
the composite indicator. The left-hand side panel reports the likelihood of currency crises.   
When almost none of the  indicators are signaling a future crisis, the composite indicator takes 
on values between zero and two, the probability of a currency crisis is about 10 percent, and 
substantially smaller than the unconditional probability of crisis, that is about 30 percent. 
However, the probability of a currency crisis increases sharply and nonlinearly as the signs of 
vulnerability of the economy increase, with the probabilities of a currency crisis reaching almost 
100 percent when the indicator is about 15 or larger. The right panel reports the same evidence 
) R - P 2(1/T = QPS 2tk t
T
1=t
k
∑  
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for banking crises. As in the case of currency crises, the probabilities of a collapse of the banking 
sector increase sharply as the economy deteriorates.  However, as we found with the univariate 
indicators, banking crises (Chapter 3) are harder to anticipate. Even when nearly 
 all the univariate indicators are signaling, the probability of a banking crisis only climbs to about 
40 percent. 
 
 
 Table 5.7 The Composite Indicator and Conditional Probabilities of Financial Crises 
 
Value of indicator 
 
Probability of a currency 
crisis 
 
Probability of a banking 
crisis 
 
0-1 
 
0.10 
 
0.03 
 
1-2 
 
0.22 
 
0.05 
 
2-3 
 
0.18 
 
0.06 
 
3-4 
 
0.21 
 
0.09 
 
4-5 
 
0.27 
 
0.12 
 
5-7 
 
0.33 
 
0.13 
 
7-9 
 
0.46 
 
0.16 
 
9-12 
 
0.65 
 
0.27 
 
12-15 
 
0.74 
 
0.37 
 
0ver 15 
 
0.96 
 
n.a. 
 
Memorandum items: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unconditional probability 
of a currency crisis 
 
Unconditional probability 
of a banking crisis 
 
 
 
0.29 
 
0.10 
 
 
 
The next table examines the forecasting accuracy of the composite indicator. 
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The top panel in Table 5.8 looks at currency crises, the bottom panel examines the same 
evidence for banking crises. In both cases, the performance of the composite indicator is 
compared to the performance of the real exchange rate--the best univariate indicator-- as well as 
the naive forecast based on the unconditional probability of crisis. The score statistics are 
reported separately for “Crisis Times” and for “Tranquil Times” to examine whether the 
performance of the different leading indicators varies across regimes. 
As shown in the top panel, the real exchange makes a substantial improvement over the 
unconditional forecast of currency crises, with the forecasting accuracy in tranquil times 
increasing substantially more than in crisis times.  Overall, the composite indicator performs 
better--in terms of accuracy-- than the real exchange rate, but the larger improvements are 
obtained when forecasting in crisis times, suggesting that in fact, crises erupt (more often than 
not) when there is widespread economic distress. 
As shown in the bottom panel, all indicators score worse when predicting the onset of the 
banking crises, that is the 24 months around the beginning of the banking crises. As it was 
examined before, the real exchange rate makes some improvement over the unconditional 
forecast of financial crises in general. For example, the quadratic probability score declines from 
0.024 and 1.620 for the naive forecast of currency crises to 0.018 and 1.589 for the real exchange 
rate forecast during tranquil and crisis times, respectively. The composite indicator outperforms 
the real exchange rate when forecasting the onset of crisis, but is in general outperformed by the 
real exchange rate during tranquil times.  This is explained by the fact that the real exchange rate 
issues very few false alarms during tranquil periods. 
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 Table 5.8. Scoring the Forecasts: Quadratic Probability Scores 
 
 
 
Currency crises 
 
Banking crises 
 
Indicator 
 
Tranquil times 
 
Crisis Times 
 
Tranquil Times 
 
Crisis Times 
 
Naive forecast 
 
0.173 
 
1.008 
 
0.024 
 
1.620 
 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
 
0.115 
 
0.979 
 
0.018 
 
1.589 
 
Composite 
indicator 
 
0.024 
 
0.862 
 
0.024 
 
1.309 
 
 
 
 
 
A Composite Indicator:  An Out-of-Sample Application to Southeast Asia 
 
 
Using the information on the monthly value of the composite indicator and the 
conditional probabilities of crises in Table 5.7, we can construct series of probabilities of crises 
for countries both in-sample, from January 1970 to December 1995, and out-of-sample, from 
January 1996 to December 1997. As an illustration, Figure 1 reports, the time-series probabilities 
of currency crises implicit in the composite indicator for four Southeast Asian economies in the 
1990s. The shaded areas in the figures are “crisis times.”  Table .. complements this information 
by providing desaggregated information on the source of the signals. This table quantifies, crisis 
by crisis, the number of the indicators showing “unusual” behavior in the 24-month period prior 
these crises, with a 1 denoting unusual behavior and a 0 denoting normal behavior. 
With the exception of Indonesia, all the Southeast Asian countries show a severe state of 
distress with about 65 percent of the indicators flashing signals. These currency crises are the 
paradigm of a typical financial crisis, with the onset of these crises occurring as the economies 
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enter a marked slowdown in growth after a prolonged boom in economic activity fueled by rapid 
credit creation.4 This dramatic surge in credit is, in large part, explained by heavy capital inflows 
and partly by the reform of the financial system, which is accompanied by drastic reductions in 
reserve requirements. Overall, the explosive growth in these countries comes to an end with a 
real appreciation of the domestic currencies (which are, in differing degrees, tied to the U.S. 
dollar) and the corresponding loss of export markets.  It is noteworthy that during the latter part 
of this period there is a substantive appreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the yen. 
For instance, short-term capital inflows to Thailand amount to 7-10 percent of GDP in 
each of the years 1994-1996, with the growth rate of credit to the nonfinancial private sector over 
1990-1995 amounting to more than 23 percent. While in the early 1990s, output growth rates 
increase to almost 9 percent fueled in part by easy credit, this rapid economic growth in Thailand 
shows signs of coming to an end with the real appreciation of the domestic currency and the 
corresponding loss of exports markets (the annual growth rate of exports falls from a peak of 30 
percent per year in 1994 to about 0 in 1996). Financial sector fragilities are also evident, with 
runs against major banks starting to occur as early as May 1996.  Finally, the sharp increase in 
interest rates in 1997 to defend the baht puts the nail in the coffin of the already defunct banking 
sector.5  Overall, 75 percent of the indicators for which there is available data were exhibiting 
“anomalous”  behavior. 
                     
     
4This is at odds with the interpretation of these crises provided in Radelet and Sachs 
(1998), who argue these crises are the byproduct of a financial panic. 
     
5
 It is noteworthy that finance companies had been receiving substantial assitance from 
the central bank during this period. 
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The boom-bust cycle in lending is also evident in the Philippines, fueled as in Thailand 
by capital inflows but also by a dramatic reduction in reserve requirements, as they underwent 
financial liberalization.  Bank credit increases by 44 percent a year in 1995-1996. As in Thailand, 
the rapidly expanding credit is an important contributor to the rally in stock and real estate 
markets, with a four-fold increase in prices in both markets. As in other countries in the region, 
foreign currency exposure increases in the Philippines in the 1990s through foreign borrowing to 
finance domestic lending, with foreign borrowing concentrated at short maturities. Consumer 
lending also increases and fuels a surge in consumption, leading to a deterioration of the current 
account, which is accentuated by the real exchange rate appreciation of the domestic currency. 
The loss of competitiveness anticipates a future decline in growth and also contributes to a 
substantial deterioration of the quality of banks' assets, further reducing the odds of survival of 
many individual financial institutions. Overall, in the Philippines, about 50 percent of the 
indicators are signaling the increased vulnerability of the economy in the two years prior to the 
collapse of the implicit peg in July 1997.6 
Malaysia has a number of features in common with Thailand. It is also affected by the 
slowdown in the region, though to a much smaller degree.  It also has current account deficits 
similar in magnitude to those in Thailand in the period 1990-1995, although in 1996 the outlook 
of the external sector improves somewhat with the current account/GDP ratio shrinking to -5.3 
                     
     
6
 The Philippines was classified as a managed float in the IMF’s exchange rate 
arrangements classification. Yet, even a relatively uninformed bystander could see the large scale 
extent of foreign exchange intervention prior to mid-1997, which kept the Philippine peso’s 
value virtually unchanged agaist the dollar. 
 23 
percent (in Thailand the current account/GDP ratio in 1996 is still -8.0 percent). Moreover, 
Malaysia as Thailand accumulates debt rapidly in the 1990s, with capital inflows fueling a stock 
and real estate market boom, with prices increasing about 300 percent in the early 1990s. 
Malaysia is also suffering from financial sector vulnerabilities (although not to the same extent 
as the other) as a result of the high degree of leveraging in the economy.  Indeed, Malaysia has 
one of the highest credit-to-GDP ratio in the world and the banks have a large exposure to the 
property and equity markets.  For Malaysia, about 60 percent of the indicators are showing signs 
of distress at the onset of the crisis. 
Indonesia, however, looks somewhat different.  While it is still true that, as the other 
countries in the area, it is exhibiting banking fragilities and short-term debt sharply exceeds 
available foreign exchange reserves (about 1.7 times the stock of foreign exchange reserves of 
the country).7 the current account deficit is not deteriorating as fast --only reaching 3.5 percent of 
GDP in 1996, the slowdown in growth is not yet evident, and the real exchange rate does not 
appreciate as much as in the other countries in the region. Only very few indicators (less than 20 
percent) are showing signs of strains in the economy in the months prior to the crisis. While the 
degree of distress in the domestic economy in the months prior to the crisis cannot explain the 
meltdown of the rupiah and of the economy as a whole in 1998, the flurries of financial crises in 
1997 do add a severe element of instability as Indonesia and the other countries in the region are 
left scrambling for liquidy when Japanese banks --the major lenders to the region-- pull out 
rapidly across countries after the major losses suffered in the wake of the Thai crisis.8  
                     
     
7
 The beginning of banking crisis in Indonesia can be dated to November 1992 when a 
large bank (Bank Summa) collapses and triggers runs on three smaller banks.  Most state-owned 
banks are also experiencing serious difficulties. 
     
8
 The reversal was, in fact, quite pronounced, from capital inflows to the region of US 
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$50 billion in 1996 to an outflow of US $21 billion in 1997. See, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1998b) and the next chapter for a  discussion on world and regional financial links and their 
effects on the probability of currency crises.  
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This chapter has focused on a specific early warning system for currency crises, which 
basically highlights that poor domestic economic conditions, either due to mistakes in public 
policy or private sector behavior, are the trigger mechanism of financial crises. We have also 
examined, however, that this was not always the case.  As we examine in greater detail in the 
next chapter, the frailty of an economy can be exacerbated by currency crises in other countries. 
For example, Indonesia falls prey of a liquidity crunch when Japanese banks recall their loans 
from all the Asian countries they had made loans to after suffering major losses with the 
devaluation of the Thai baht. Similarly, the fierce but unsucsseful speculative attack on the 
Argentine peso following the devaluation of the Mexican peso are difficult to explain on 
exclusively on the basis of economic fundamentals at the time of the attack. In the next chapter, 
we combine the information on the domestic economy with that of possible spillover effects 
from other countries in crisis. 
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 APPENDIX A: DATA AND DEFINITIONS 
Crisis index: The index is a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve changes, with 
weights such that the two components of the index have equal conditional volatilities.  Since 
changes in the exchange rate enter with a positive weight and changes in reserves have a 
negative weight attached, readings of this index that were three standard deviations or more 
above the mean were cataloged as crises.  For countries in the sample that had hyperinflation, 
the construction of the index was modified.  While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic 
for a country with low-to-moderate inflation, a devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace 
during hyperinflations.  A single index for the countries that had hyperinflation episodes would 
miss sizable devaluations and reserve losses in the moderate inflation periods, since the historic 
mean is distorted by the high-inflation episode.  To avoid this, we divided the sample according 
to whether inflation in the previous six months was higher than 150 percent and then 
constructed an index for each subsample.  Our cataloging of crises for these countries coincides 
fairly tightly with our chronology of currency market disruptions. Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz (1995) also include interest rates in this index, however, our data on 
market-determined interest rates for developing countries does not span the entire sample. 
The indicators: 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund; Emerging 
Market Indicators, International Finance Corporation (IFC); World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank, when data was missing from these sources, central bank bulletins and other 
country-specific sources were used as supplements.  Unless otherwise noted, we used 12-month 
percent changes. 
1. M2 multiplier: The ratio of M2 to base money, (IFS lines 34 plus 35) divided by IFS line 14. 
  35 
2.  Domestic credit/nominal GDP: IFS line 52 divided by  IFS line 99b (interpolated).  Monthly 
nominal GDP was interpolated from annual or quarterly data.  
3.  Real interest rates on deposits: IFS line 60l, monthly rates, deflated using consumer prices 
(IFS line 64) expressed in percentage points.  
4. The ratio of lending rates to deposit rates: IFS line 60p divided by  IFS line60l; was used in 
lieu of differentials to ameliorate the distortions caused by the large percentage point spreads 
observed during high inflation.  In levels. 
  5.  “Excess” real balances: M1 (IFS line34) deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64) less an 
estimated demand for money.  The demand for real balances is determined by real GDP 
(interpolated IFS line99b), domestic consumer price inflation, and a time trend.  Domestic 
inflation was used in lieu of nominal interest rates, as market-determined interest rates were not 
available during the entire sample for a number of countries; the time trend (which can enter 
log-linearly, linearly, or exponentially) is motivated by its role as a proxy for financial 
innovation and/or currency substitution.  Excess money supply (demand) during pre-crisis 
periods (mc) is reported as a percent relative to excess supply (demand) during tranquil times 
(mt)--that is, 100 x (mc-mt)/mt. 
6.  M2 (in US dollars)/reserves (in US dollars): IFS lines 34 plus 35 converted into dollars 
(using IFS line ae) divided by  IFS line 1L.d. 
7.  Bank deposits: IFS line 24 plus 25.  
8.  Exports (in US dollars): IFS line 70. 
9.  Imports (in US dollars): IFS line 71. 
10. The terms of trade: the unit value of exports (IFS line 74) over the unit value of imports 
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(IFS line 75).  For those developing countries where import unit values (or import price indices) 
were not available, an index of prices of manufactured exports from industrial countries to 
developing countries was used. 
11.  The real exchange rate: This measure used is based on consumer price indexes (IFS lines 
64) and is defined as the relative price of foreign goods (in domestic currency) to the price of 
domestic goods.  If the central bank of the home country pegs the currency to the dollar 
(Deutsche mark), the relevant foreign price index is that of the United States (Germany). Hence, 
for all the European countries the foreign price index is that of Germany while for all the other 
countries, consumer prices in the United States were used. The trend was specified as, 
alternatively, log-linear, linear, and exponential; the best fit among these was selected on a 
country-by-country basis.  Deviations from trend during crisis periods (dc) were compared to 
the deviations during tranquil times (dt) and are shown in Figures 2 and 3 as a percent of the 
deviations in tranquil times (i.e.,100 x (dc-dt)/dt). 
12.  Reserves: IFS line 1L.d. 
13.  Domestic-foreign interest rate differential on deposits: Monthly rates in percentage 
points. IFS lines 60l. Interest rates in the home country are compared with interest rates in the 
United States (Germany) if the domestic central bank pegs the currency to the dollar (Deutsche 
mark).  The real interest rate is given by 100 x [((1+ it)pt /pt+1-1]. 
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14.  Output: For most countries, the measure of output used is industrial production (IFS 
line 66).  However, for some countries (the commodity exporters) an index of output of 
primary commodities is used (IFS lines 66aa). 
15: Stock returns (in dollars): IFC global indices are used for all emerging markets; for 
industrial countries the quotes from the main bourses are used.  
16.  Overall budget balance/GDP: Consolidated public sector balance as share of 
nominal GD 
 
 
 
 
